Patent Breadth in an International Setting

38 Pages Posted: 8 May 2017

See all articles by Eric W. Bond

Eric W. Bond

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Ben Zissimos

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 04, 2017

Abstract

We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North.South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare.

Keywords: coordination, innovation, patent breadth, patent race, R&D

JEL Classification: F020, F130, O300, O310, O320

Suggested Citation

Bond, Eric Wirths and Zissimos, Ben, Patent Breadth in an International Setting (April 04, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6411, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2964785

Eric Wirths Bond

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
615-322-3237 (Phone)
615-343-8495 (Fax)

Ben Zissimos (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/cv/ZissimosCV.pdf

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