Patent Breadth in an International Setting
38 Pages Posted: 8 May 2017
Date Written: April 04, 2017
We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North.South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare.
Keywords: coordination, innovation, patent breadth, patent race, R&D
JEL Classification: F020, F130, O300, O310, O320
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bond, Eric Wirths and Zissimos, Ben, Patent Breadth in an International Setting (April 04, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6411, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2964785
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