The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling

Tatiani Synodinou, Philippe Jougleux, Christiana Markou, Thalia Prastitou (eds.), EU Internet Law: Regulation and Enforcement (Springer, 2017, Forthcoming)

University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2017-20

23 Pages Posted: 8 May 2017 Last revised: 9 Mar 2018

Isak Mendoza

University of Oslo - Department of Private Law

Lee A. Bygrave

University of Oslo

Date Written: May 8, 2017

Abstract

In this chapter, a critical analysis is undertaken of the provisions of Art. 22 of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation of 2016, with lines of comparison drawn to the predecessor for these provisions – namely Art. 15 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Article 22 places limits on the making of fully automated decisions based on profiling when the decisions incur legal effects or similarly significant consequences for the persons subject to them. The basic argument advanced in the chapter is that Art. 22 on its face provides persons with stronger protections from such decision making than does Art. 15 of the Directive. However, doubts are raised as to whether Art. 22 will have a significant practical impact on automated profiling.

Suggested Citation

Mendoza, Isak and Bygrave, Lee A., The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling (May 8, 2017). Tatiani Synodinou, Philippe Jougleux, Christiana Markou, Thalia Prastitou (eds.), EU Internet Law: Regulation and Enforcement (Springer, 2017, Forthcoming); University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2017-20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964855

Isak Mendoza

University of Oslo - Department of Private Law ( email )

Karl Johansgt 47
N-0162, Oslo
Norway

Lee A. Bygrave (Contact Author)

University of Oslo ( email )

PO Box 6706 St Olavs plass
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

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