Transparency Diminishes Framing-Effects in Voting on Redistribution: Some Experimental Evidence

29 Pages Posted: 9 May 2017

See all articles by Fabian Paetzel

Fabian Paetzel

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universität; DFG Research Group 2104

Jan Lorenz

Jacobs University Bremen

Markus S. Tepe

University of Oldenburg

Date Written: May 9, 2017

Abstract

This study analyzes whether enabling people to get informed about redistributive consequences is an effective measure to prevent equivalence framing in the domain of voting on redistribution. Utilizing a simplified version of the Meltzer-Richard model, an equivalent frame is induced by letting subjects vote either on a proportional tax rate or an outcome equivalent minimum net income. In a series of laboratory experiments we find that framing effects both on the individually preferred and collectively agreed level of redistribution are tremendously strong if the information tool is not available (low transparency condition). Once subjects have access to the information tool (high transparency condition), the framing effect on individually preferred tax rates is significantly reduced, and after group communication, the framing effect is washed out from the collective decision. Thus, the availability of the information tool has an asymmetric effect on the level of redistribution if subjects have to set a redistributive tax rate and lowers redistribution if subjects have to set a minimum income level.

Keywords: redistribution, voting, framing, transparency, minimal income

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D72

Suggested Citation

Paetzel, Fabian and Lorenz, Jan and Tepe, Markus S., Transparency Diminishes Framing-Effects in Voting on Redistribution: Some Experimental Evidence (May 9, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965442 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965442

Fabian Paetzel (Contact Author)

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universität ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, 22008
Germany

DFG Research Group 2104 ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, DE 22043
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/en?set_language=en

Jan Lorenz

Jacobs University Bremen ( email )

Campus Ring 1
Bremen, 28759
Germany

Markus S. Tepe

University of Oldenburg ( email )

Ammerländer Heerstraße 114-118
Oldenburg, DE D-26111
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tepems.de

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