Choice-of-Court Agreements in Electronic Consumer Contracts in China

Pandora's Box 2016: Law and Technology The Annual Academic Journal of the Justice and the Law Society of the University of Queensland.

11 Pages Posted: 12 May 2017

See all articles by Zheng (Sophia) Tang

Zheng (Sophia) Tang

Wuhan University Institute of International Law; Newcastle University

Alison Xu

Waseda Institute for Advanced Study

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

This paper critically examines the effectiveness of choice of court agreement in e-consumer contracts in China. It at first compares the regulation of Chinese law on e-consumer contracts with US and EU approaches. Based on some recently published cases, this paper argues that the protection of local business and the need of safeguarding jurisdiction of Chinese courts are central concerns underlining the current legislative framework. However, an attitude of local protectionism may cause difficulties for local exporting e-businesses when expanding their business overseas. At this stage, the guided cases released by Supreme People’s Court may be the most effective way to bring uniformity and certainty into current Chinese law to improve the level of consumer protection in internet jurisdiction rules.

Keywords: consumer law; choice of court agreement; conflict of laws; Chinese law

Suggested Citation

Tang, Zheng and Xu, Alison, Choice-of-Court Agreements in Electronic Consumer Contracts in China (2016). Pandora's Box 2016: Law and Technology The Annual Academic Journal of the Justice and the Law Society of the University of Queensland., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965801

Zheng Tang (Contact Author)

Wuhan University Institute of International Law ( email )

Institute of International Law
Wuhan University
Wuhan, Hubei 430072
China

Newcastle University ( email )

Newcastle University
Newcastle, NE1 7RU
United Kingdom

Alison Xu

Waseda Institute for Advanced Study ( email )

1-21-1 Nishiwaseda
Shinjuku, Tokyo 169-0051
Japan

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