The Choice Theory of Contracts (Introduction)

The Choice Theory of Contracts, Cambridge University Press, 2017

Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-552

Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 567

29 Pages Posted: 12 May 2017 Last revised: 4 Feb 2020

See all articles by Hanoch Dagan

Hanoch Dagan

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Michael Heller

Columbia University - Columbia Law School

Date Written: April 30, 2017

Abstract

This concise landmark in law and jurisprudence offers the first coherent, liberal account of contract law. "The Choice Theory of Contracts" answers the field's most pressing questions: What is the “freedom” in “freedom of contract”? What core values animate contract law and how do those values interrelate? How must the state act when it shapes contract law? Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller show exactly why and how freedom matters to contract. They start with the most appealing tenets of modern liberalism and end with their implications for contract law. This readable, engaging book gives contract scholars, teachers, and students a powerful normative vocabulary for understanding canonical cases, refining key doctrines, and solving long-standing puzzles in the law.

Keywords: contract, contract law, contract theory, private law theory, legal theory, jurisprudence, philosophy of law, family law, consumer protection, employment law

JEL Classification: K12, K39, D86

Suggested Citation

Dagan, Hanoch and Heller, Michael, The Choice Theory of Contracts (Introduction) (April 30, 2017). The Choice Theory of Contracts, Cambridge University Press, 2017, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-552, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 567, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966257

Hanoch Dagan

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 7302 (Phone)

Michael Heller (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

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