Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists

70 Pages Posted: 13 May 2017 Last revised: 28 Aug 2019

Date Written: August 26, 2019

Abstract

To study waiting-lists as allocation mechanisms, we analyze a class of waiting-list mechanisms where agents are offered a choice among items with corresponding expected waiting times. Because the expected waiting time required for a given item fluctuates over time, different agents may face different waiting times, potentially resulting in misallocation of items. In a stylized model we derive expressions for welfare and compare mechanisms. We find that a simple randomized assignment policy can decrease expected wait fluctuations, thereby reducing misallocation and increasing welfare.

Keywords: Dynamic Matching, Waiting-Lists, Queueing, Misallocation, Rationing

JEL Classification: C78, C61, D3

Suggested Citation

Leshno, Jacob, Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists (August 26, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2967011 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967011

Jacob Leshno (Contact Author)

Chicago Booth ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60610
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
274
Abstract Views
1,177
rank
121,849
PlumX Metrics