Country-Specific Investments and the Rights of Non-Citizen

14 Pages Posted: 12 May 2017 Last revised: 14 Jul 2017

See all articles by Adam Chilton

Adam Chilton

University of Chicago - Law School

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: Febuary 3, 2017

Abstract

In a 2007 article, Adam Cox and Eric Posner developed a “Second Order” theory of immigration law that offered predictions about when countries are likely to provide non-citizens with strong legal protections from removal. They argued that states benefit when migrants make “country-specific” investments, but that migrants are only willing to make those investments when they are afforded strong legal protections that would secure their place in the host country. One implication of this theory was that because countries with less common national languages require greater country-specific investments from migrants, those countries are likely to provide migrants with strong legal protections. In this essay, we empirically evaluate that hypothesis. Consistent with the theory, we find that countries with less common national languages are more likely to provide a Right to Asylum in their constitution or sign Bilateral Labor Agreements.

Keywords: Human Rights, Migration, Immigration, Bilateral Labor Agreements

Suggested Citation

Chilton, Adam and Posner, Eric A., Country-Specific Investments and the Rights of Non-Citizen (Febuary 3, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2967556 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967556

Adam Chilton (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.adamchilton.org

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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