Corruption in International Business

Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2016. Corruption in international business. Journal of World Business, 51: 35-49.

27 Pages Posted: 15 May 2017

See all articles by Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra

Northeastern University - Department of International Business and Strategy

Date Written: July 30, 2015

Abstract

I analyze corruption in international business, presenting a critical assessment of the topic and providing suggestions for future research. I argue that corruption creates a laboratory for expanding international business studies because its illegal nature, the differences in perception about illegality, and the variation in the enforcement of laws against bribery across countries challenge some of the assumptions upon which arguments have been built, i.e., that managers can choose appropriate actions without major legal implications. Hence, I first provide suggestion for how to analyze the topic of corruption in future studies by analyzing the types, measures, causes, consequences, and controls of corruption. I then provide suggestions for how to extend leading theories of the firm by using corruption as a laboratory that challenges some of the assumptions of these theories: extending agency theory by analyzing the existence of unethical agency relationships; extending transaction cost economics by analyzing illegal transaction costs minimization; extending the resource-based view by studying corporate social irresponsibility capability; extending resource dependency by analyzing the ethical power escape; and extending the neo-institutional theory by studying illegal legitimacy.

Keywords: corruption, bribery, international business, multinationals, theory

JEL Classification: D73; F23

Suggested Citation

Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro, Corruption in International Business (July 30, 2015). Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2016. Corruption in international business. Journal of World Business, 51: 35-49.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2967999 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967999

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra (Contact Author)

Northeastern University - Department of International Business and Strategy ( email )

D'Amore-McKim School of Business
313 Hayden Hall, 360 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
United States
16173736568 (Phone)
16173738628 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://cuervo-cazurra.com

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