Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Failures

METEOR Research Memorandum Working Paper No. 01/020

12 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2002

See all articles by P. Jean-Jacques Herings

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Maastricht University

Ana Mauleon

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date Written: November 2001

Abstract

We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The novelty is that we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device, where each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device.

Keywords: Coordination Games, Coordination Failures, Rationalizability, Matching Devices

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D61

Suggested Citation

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Mauleon Echeverria, Ana Carmen and Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Failures (November 2001). METEOR Research Memorandum Working Paper No. 01/020. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=296821 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.296821

P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Contact Author)

Maastricht University ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 616
6200 MD Maastricht
Netherlands
+31 43 3883636 (Phone)
+31 43 3884878 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/p.herings/herings.htm

Ana Carmen Mauleon Echeverria

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles ( email )

Brussels, 1000
Belgium

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

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