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Competition and Entry: Do Entrants Deserve Special Protection in India and Other Emerging Economies?

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2017 Forthcoming)

22 Pages Posted: 16 May 2017  

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Jan Peter van der Veer

RBB Economics

Date Written: May 16, 2017

Abstract

We discuss the question whether competition policy should provide entrants with special protection in the Indian competition law context. Under an effects based approach, competition enforcement should to protect consumers rather than the interests of individual competitors. Entrants deserve special protection only in recently liberalized markets characterized by the presence of a former state monopoly or a current SOE that display specific characteristics such as natural monopoly. Barring such highly specific circumstances, promoting competitors over consumers hurts consumer welfare and innovation. India’s Competition Act is an essential tool for policymakers to promote a transition to greater country competitiveness, innovation, and economic prosperity for India. To achieve these objectives, CCI must implement the Competition Act in a manner that promotes consumers over competitors, and minimizes the distortions of industrial policies instead of amplifying them.

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, India, SOEs, entry, natural monopoly

JEL Classification: K21, L41, L43, F63

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel and van der Veer, Jan Peter, Competition and Entry: Do Entrants Deserve Special Protection in India and Other Emerging Economies? (May 16, 2017). Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2017 Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2968907

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )

200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Jan Peter Van der Veer

RBB Economics ( email )

London WC1V 7BD
United Kingdom

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