Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Josué Ortega, Social integration in two-sided matching markets, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 78, 2018, Pages 119-126, ISSN 0304-4068, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.003. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406818300892) Keywords: Social integration
22 Pages Posted: 25 May 2017 Last revised: 23 Sep 2018
Date Written: July 10, 2018
Abstract
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity, which requires that every agent becomes better off after any number of matching markets merge. Integration monotonicity is also incompatible with the weaker efficiency property of Pareto optimality.
Nevertheless, I obtain two possibility results. First, stable matching mechanisms never hurt more than one-half of the society after the integration of several matching markets occurs. Second, in random matching markets there are positive expected gains from integration for both sides of the market, which I quantify.
Keywords: social integration, integration monotonicity, matching schemes, two-sided matching.
JEL Classification: C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation