The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing - An Event Study of Leaked Customer Information from Banks in Tax Havens

EPRU Working Paper Series 2017-01

39 Pages Posted: 23 May 2017

See all articles by Niels Johannesen

Niels Johannesen

University of Copenhagen

Tim Stolper

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: April 10, 2017

Abstract

We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax haven bank caused a significant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks known to be assisting with tax evasion and that the decrease was largest for the banks most strongly involved. These findings suggest that markets expected the leak to increase the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion and thus to lower both demand and supply in the market for criminal offshore banking services. This interpretation finds support in further evidence that the leak caused a sharp drop in foreign-owned deposits in tax havens.

Keywords: whistleblowing, economic crime, tax evasion, tax havens

JEL Classification: G21, H26, K42

Suggested Citation

Johannesen, Niels and Stolper, Tim, The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing - An Event Study of Leaked Customer Information from Banks in Tax Havens (April 10, 2017). EPRU Working Paper Series 2017-01 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972511 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2972511

Niels Johannesen (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Nørregade 10
Copenhagen, København DK-1165
Denmark

Tim Stolper

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
59
rank
352,954
Abstract Views
780
PlumX Metrics