Cryptodemocracy and its institutional possibilities
The Review of Austrian Economics, vol. 33, no 3.
11 Pages Posted: 24 May 2017 Last revised: 28 Oct 2020
Date Written: July 1, 2018
Democracy is an economic problem of choice constrained by transaction costs and information costs. Society must choose between competing institutional frameworks for the conduct of voting and elections. These decisions are constrained by the technologies and institutions available. Blockchains are a governance technology that reduces the costs of consensus, coordinating information, and monitoring and enforcing contracts. Blockchain could be applied to the voting and electoral process to form a crypto-democracy. Analysed through the Institutional Possibility Frontier framework, we propose that blockchain lowers disorder and dictatorship costs of the voting and electoral process. In addition to efficiency gains, this technological progress has implications for decentralised institutions of voting. One application of crypto-democracy, quadratic voting, is discussed.
Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptoeconomics, Democracy, New comparative economics, New institutional economics, Transaction cost economics, Voting
JEL Classification: D02, D7, D72, P4, P00, K00
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation