Cryptodemocracy and its institutional possibilities

The Review of Austrian Economics, vol. 33, no 3.

11 Pages Posted: 24 May 2017 Last revised: 28 Oct 2020

See all articles by Darcy W E Allen

Darcy W E Allen

RMIT University

Chris Berg

RMIT University

Aaron M. Lane

RMIT University

Jason Potts

RMIT University

Date Written: July 1, 2018

Abstract

Democracy is an economic problem of choice constrained by transaction costs and information costs. Society must choose between competing institutional frameworks for the conduct of voting and elections. These decisions are constrained by the technologies and institutions available. Blockchains are a governance technology that reduces the costs of consensus, coordinating information, and monitoring and enforcing contracts. Blockchain could be applied to the voting and electoral process to form a crypto-democracy. Analysed through the Institutional Possibility Frontier framework, we propose that blockchain lowers disorder and dictatorship costs of the voting and electoral process. In addition to efficiency gains, this technological progress has implications for decentralised institutions of voting. One application of crypto-democracy, quadratic voting, is discussed.

Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptoeconomics, Democracy, New comparative economics, New institutional economics, Transaction cost economics, Voting

JEL Classification: D02, D7, D72, P4, P00, K00

Suggested Citation

Allen, Darcy and Berg, Chris and Lane, Aaron M. and Potts, Jason, Cryptodemocracy and its institutional possibilities (July 1, 2018). The Review of Austrian Economics, vol. 33, no 3. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973050 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973050

Darcy Allen

RMIT University ( email )

440 Elizabeth Street
Melbourne, 3000
Australia

Chris Berg

RMIT University ( email )

124 La Trobe Street
Melbourne, 3000
Australia

Jason Potts

RMIT University ( email )

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
969
Abstract Views
3,855
rank
25,785
PlumX Metrics