International Protection of Intellectual Property

46 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2002

See all articles by Gene M. Grossman

Gene M. Grossman

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; Princeton University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Edwin L.-C. Lai

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation and in their absolute and comparative advantage in manufacturing. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country's patents that are applied with national treatment. After describing the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, 'why are patents longer in the North?' We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.

Keywords: Patents, intellectual property, harmonization, TRIPs

JEL Classification: F13, O34

Suggested Citation

Grossman, Gene M. and Lai, Edwin L.-C., International Protection of Intellectual Property (January 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3118. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=297320

Gene M. Grossman (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

300 Fisher Hall
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Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
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609-258-4823 (Phone)
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Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Edwin L.-C. Lai

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics ( email )

Clear Water Bay
Kowloon, Hong Kong
China

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