Ownership, Organization Structure and Performance in Public Service Provision: The Case of Museums

Posted: 30 May 2017 Last revised: 1 Apr 2018

See all articles by Enrico Bertacchini

Enrico Bertacchini

University of Turin - Department of Economics

Chiara Dalle Nogare

University of Brescia - Department of Economics

Raffaele Scuderi

Kore University of Enna - School of Economics

Date Written: May 28, 2017

Abstract

This article provides an empirical investigation of the effects of the ownership and organizational structure on the performance of cultural institutions. More specifically, we consider how museums are effective in their function of disseminating culture to audiences and contributing to the local development. By exploiting a unique data set based on the 2011 census of Italian museums, we develop performance indices of accessibility, visitors’ experience, web visibility and promotion of the local cultural context. Using count data models, we regress such measures on the type of organization. We distinguish between governmental museums, public museums whose administration is either outsourced or has financial autonomy and private museums. We control for the most salient characteristics of a museum, competition pressure and some proxies of potential audience. Our evidence shows that private museums, public museums with financial autonomy and outsourced museums outperform public museums run as sub-units of culture departments. This paper contributes to the cultural economics and public policy and administration literature by adding insights into the effect of outsourcing and administrative decentralization in the public cultural sector.

Keywords: public sector performance, outsourcing, decentralization, museums

JEL Classification: L33, Z18, H42

Suggested Citation

Bertacchini, Enrico and Dalle Nogare, Chiara and Scuderi, Raffaele, Ownership, Organization Structure and Performance in Public Service Provision: The Case of Museums (May 28, 2017). Journal of Cultural Economics, 2018, DOI:10.1007/s10824-018-9321-9, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2976083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2976083

Enrico Bertacchini

University of Turin - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Po 53
Torino, Turin - Piedmont 10100
Italy

Chiara Dalle Nogare

University of Brescia - Department of Economics ( email )

Via San Faustino 74B
Brescia, 25122
Italy

Raffaele Scuderi (Contact Author)

Kore University of Enna - School of Economics ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Law
Via delle Olimpiadi
Enna, Enna 94100
Italy

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