Design of Macro-Prudential Stress Tests
Simon Business School Working Paper No. FR 17-14
Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-41
220 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2017 Last revised: 6 Nov 2021
Date Written: November 5, 2021
Abstract
We study the design of stress tests that provide information about aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in banks’ portfolios and impose contingent capital requirements. In the optimal static test, an adverse scenario fails all weak and some strong banks, limiting the stigma of failure. Sequential tests outperform static tests. Under natural conditions, the optimal sequential test consists of a precautionary recapitalization followed by a scenario that fails only weak banks, similar to TARP in 2008 followed by SCAP in 2009. Our results also shed light on the Federal Reserve’s decision to test the banks twice in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Keywords: Stress Tests, Capital Requirements, Systemic Risk, Macro-Prudential Regulation, Mechanism Design, Dynamic mechanisms, Bayesian Persuasion.
JEL Classification: G01, G28, D61, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation