Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance

TI 2017-049/VI, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper

39 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2017

See all articles by Pieter A. Gautier

Pieter A. Gautier

Free University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Arjen Siegmann

VU University Amsterdam

Aico van Vuuren

Department of Economics, Gothenburg University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 31, 2017

Abstract

Do higher real-estate agent fees imply better performance? This study uses a nation-wide data set of residential real-estate transactions in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2011 to provide evidence against this. Brokers with a flat-fee structure who charge an up-front fee (which is substantially lower than the average fee of traditional brokers) and leave the viewings to the seller sell faster and at - on average - 2.7 percent higher prices. We correct for fixed house - and time effects. We provide additional evidence that the price difference is not due to a seller-selection effect.

Keywords: real-estate brokers, broker incentives, housing, agency

JEL Classification: D80, L10, L80, R20, R30

Suggested Citation

Gautier, Pieter A. and Siegmann, Arjen and van Vuuren, Aico, Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance (May 31, 2017). TI 2017-049/VI, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977829 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2977829

Pieter A. Gautier

Free University of Amsterdam ( email )

Amsterdam, ND North Holland
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Arjen Siegmann (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Dept. of Finance
Amsterdam, NOT IN US OR CANADA 1081 HV
Netherlands
+31205986581 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.vu.nl/a.h.siegmann

Aico Van Vuuren

Department of Economics, Gothenburg University ( email )

Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/aicovanvuurenshomepage/

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