Information and Communication Technologies, Protests, and Censorship

57 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2017 Last revised: 22 Aug 2019

See all articles by Maxim Ananyev

Maxim Ananyev

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Galina Zudenkova

TU Dortmund University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Maria Petrova

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona School of Economics; Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA)

Date Written: August 20, 2019

Abstract

We develop a theory of information flows and political regime change, when citizens use information and communication technologies (ICTs) for both information acquisition and protest coordination. Governments can respond by obfuscation of citizens' signal or by restricting access to ICTs used for coordination. We find that introduction of communication technologies lowers the probability of regime survival, but this effect is weaker in economies that do not use ICTs for production. We also expect less competent governments to use coordination censorship, though this effect is weaker in economies that use ICTs extensively. Some high-frequency empirical evidence is consistent with our predictions.

Keywords: censorship, ICTs, revolution, regime change, global games, DDoS

JEL Classification: D7, D8

Suggested Citation

Ananyev, Maxim and Xefteris, Dimitrios and Zudenkova, Galina and Petrova, Maria, Information and Communication Technologies, Protests, and Censorship (August 20, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978549 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2978549

Maxim Ananyev

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

Galina Zudenkova (Contact Author)

TU Dortmund University ( email )

Friedrich-Wöhler-Weg 6
Dortmund, 44227
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Maria Petrova

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA) ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

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