Is the Rent Too High? Aggregate Implications of Local Land-Use Regulation

44 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2017

Date Written: 2017-06

Abstract

Highly productive U.S. cities are characterized by high housing prices, low housing stock growth, and restrictive land-use regulations (e.g., San Francisco). While new residents would benefit from housing stock growth in cities with highly productive firms, existing residents justify strict local land-use regulations on the grounds of congestion and other costs of further development. This paper assesses the welfare implications of these local regulations for income, congestion, and urban sprawl within a general-equilibrium model with endogenous regulation. In the model, households choose from locations that vary exogenously by productivity and endogenously according to local externalities of congestion and sharing. Existing residents address these externalities by voting for regulations that limit local housing density. In equilibrium, these regulations bind and house prices compensate for differences across locations. Relative to the planner's optimum, the decentralized model generates spatial misallocation whereby high-productivity locations are settled at too-low densities. The model admits a straightforward calibration based on observed population density, expenditure shares on consumption and local services, and local incomes. Welfare and output would be 1.4% and 2.1% higher, respectively, under the planner's allocation. Abolishing zoning regulations entirely would increase GDP by 6%, but lower welfare by 5.9% because of greater congestion.

Keywords: General Equilibrium, House Prices, Housing Supply, Regulation, Urban, Rural, & Regional Economics

JEL Classification: R52, H73, E61

Suggested Citation

Bunten, Devin Michelle, Is the Rent Too High? Aggregate Implications of Local Land-Use Regulation (2017-06). FEDS Working Paper No. 2017-064. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980048 or http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2017.064

Devin Michelle Bunten (Contact Author)

MIT ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.devinbunten.com

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
76
rank
305,708
Abstract Views
397
PlumX Metrics