Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability

51 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2002

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrea Prat

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

It is widely recognized that active media can play a role in enhancing political competition by informing voters. Collusion between government and media can, however, undermine this role. We extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them. In equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture. We examine evidence both across countries and within India.

JEL Classification: D70, H10

Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Prat, Andrea, Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (January 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=298049

Timothy J. Besley (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Andrea Prat

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom