Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability

51 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2002

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrea Prat

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

It is widely recognized that active media can play a role in enhancing political competition by informing voters. Collusion between government and media can, however, undermine this role. We extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them. In equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture. We examine evidence both across countries and within India.

JEL Classification: D70, H10

Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Prat, Andrea, Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (January 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3132. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=298049

Timothy J. Besley (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 6702 (Phone)
+44 20 7955 6951 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Andrea Prat

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
62
rank
200,969
Abstract Views
5,341
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations will be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information