Dworkin's Theory of Rights in the Age of Proportionality

(12) Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Forthcoming

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 11/2017

17 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2017 Last revised: 4 Dec 2018

See all articles by Kai Möller

Kai Möller

London School of Economics - Law Department

Date Written: June 5, 2017

Abstract

There is probably no conceptualisation of rights more famous than Ronald Dworkin’s claim that they are ‘trumps’. This seems to stand in stark contrast to the dominant, proportionality-based strand of rights discourse, according to which rights, instead of trumping competing interests, ultimately have to be balanced against them. The goal of this article is to reconcile Dworkin’s work and proportionality and thereby make a contribution to our understanding of both. It offers a critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory of rights which does away with the misleading label of rights as ‘trumps’ and shows that, far from being in conflict with proportionality, properly understood Dworkin’s work supports and supplements that doctrine and provides a much-needed account of its moral foundation as being about human dignity, freedom, and equality.

Suggested Citation

Möller, Kai, Dworkin's Theory of Rights in the Age of Proportionality (June 5, 2017). (12) Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Forthcoming; LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 11/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981003

Kai Möller (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law Department ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/kai-moller.htm

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
499
Abstract Views
2,099
rank
57,005
PlumX Metrics