Nash Bargaining Solution and its Generalizations in Intellectual Property Litigation; VirnetX and Analysis of the Court’s Decision

Bhattacharya, Rajeev R.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2981024

Nash Bargaining Solution and its Generalizations in Intellectual Property Litigation; VirnetX and Analysis of the Court’s Decision

Journal of International Business and Law (Forthcoming)

15 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2017 Last revised: 11 Nov 2019

See all articles by Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

Washington Finance and Economics; Johns Hopkins University

Date Written: June 6, 2019

Abstract

I explain the Nash Bargaining Solution and its generalizations. I discuss their pros and cons in the context of intellectual property litigation. I then provide a description and analysis of the Court’s decision in VirnetX from this perspective.

Keywords: Nash Bargaining Solution; Generalizations; Asymmetric Bargaining Power; Intellectual Property; Litigation; VirnetX

JEL Classification: C78, C71, C72, D80, K11, L11, O34

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Bhattacharya, Rajeev, Nash Bargaining Solution and its Generalizations in Intellectual Property Litigation; VirnetX and Analysis of the Court’s Decision (June 6, 2019). Journal of International Business and Law (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2981024