Repeated Games

Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, Eds. Mie Augier, David J. Teece, ISBN 978-1-137-49190-9, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016

3 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2017

See all articles by Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

Washington Finance and Economics; Johns Hopkins University

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

A repeated game is where the stage game is repeated a number of times – the number of repetitions could be finite or infinite. We usually assume that (a) the stage game has a finite number of players, (b) for each player, the set of feasible actions for the stage game is finite, and (c) the stage game is simultaneous. For a finitely repeated game, the only subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game are where a Nash equilibrium of the stage game is played in each period. For an infinitely repeated game, every feasible payoff vector that strictly dominates the players’ minmax values can be sustained in equilibrium for sufficiently high discount factors.

Keywords: Repeated Games, Multistage Games, Nash Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect, Cooperation

JEL Classification: C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Bhattacharya, Rajeev, Repeated Games (2014). Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, Eds. Mie Augier, David J. Teece, ISBN 978-1-137-49190-9, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981086

Rajeev Bhattacharya (Contact Author)

Washington Finance and Economics ( email )

United States

HOME PAGE: http://washington-finance.com

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