Trusting Banks in China

28 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2017 Last revised: 27 Aug 2022

See all articles by Zuzana Fungáčová

Zuzana Fungáčová

Bank of Finland - Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

Laurent Weill

University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie)

Date Written: June 5, 2017

Abstract

Trust in banks is essential to financial system effectiveness. This study examines the determinants of trust in banks in China. Using the most recent wave of the World Values Survey, which included information on trust in banks from the survey in China in 2012, we perform ordered logit estimations to investigate the potential influence of a large set of individual and provincial indicators on trust in banks. We observe the influence of certain sociodemographic indicators. Membership in the Communist Party and living in a rural area are negatively associated with trust in banks. Age and satisfaction with financial situation contribute to higher trust in banks, while being married and having a higher level of education tend to lower trust in banks. Access to information regardless of the type of media disseminating the information newspapers, television, internet) seem to have no impact on trust in banks. Economic values influence trust in banks. In particular, individuals who favor inequality as an incentive for individual effort or support an expanded government ownership role in the economy tend to trust banks more.

Keywords: banking, trust, China

JEL Classification: G21, O16, P34

Suggested Citation

Fungacova, Zuzana and Weill, Laurent, Trusting Banks in China (June 5, 2017). BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 9/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981601

Zuzana Fungacova (Contact Author)

Bank of Finland - Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) ( email )

Snellmaninaukio
PO Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

HOME PAGE: http://www.bof.fi/bofit_en/index.htm

Laurent Weill

University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) ( email )

61 Avenue de la Forêt Noire
F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
72
Abstract Views
548
Rank
670,933
PlumX Metrics