Endogenous Lobbying Position in Intra-Industry Trade

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

12 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2002

See all articles by Larry D. Qiu

Larry D. Qiu

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2001

Abstract

A two-country, two-firm model has been developed to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra-industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free-trader position. The model predicts that taking the free-trader (protectionist) lobbying position is an efficient (inefficient) firm's dominant strategy. In addition, for any lobbying position taken by a firm, its lobbying effort always decreases as its production cost increases. The findings help shed light on some empirical observations.

Keywords: Lobbying, Endogenous position, Intra-industry trade, Protectionist, Free trader

JEL Classification: F12, F13

Suggested Citation

Qiu, Larry Dongxiao, Endogenous Lobbying Position in Intra-Industry Trade (November 2001). Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=298307 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.298307

Larry Dongxiao Qiu (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics ( email )

School of Economics and Finance
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://www.bm.ust.hk/~larryqiu/

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
89
Abstract Views
829
rank
284,321
PlumX Metrics