Lobbying in Europe: New Firm-Level Evidence

28 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2017

See all articles by Konstantinos Dellis

Konstantinos Dellis

University of Piraeus

David Sondermann

European Central Bank (ECB)

Date Written: June 9, 2017

Abstract

Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors.

Keywords: lobbying, regulation, political economy

JEL Classification: D72, D78, O38

Suggested Citation

Dellis, Konstantinos and Sondermann, David, Lobbying in Europe: New Firm-Level Evidence (June 9, 2017). ECB Working Paper No. 2071. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2984891

Konstantinos Dellis (Contact Author)

University of Piraeus ( email )

Karaoli and Dimitriou 80
80 KARAOLI & DIMITRIOU STREET
Piraeus, Attiki 18534
Greece

David Sondermann

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

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