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Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 125, No. 3, September 2017, pp. 637-647

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 908

32 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2017 Last revised: 12 Dec 2017

See all articles by Alma Cohen

Alma Cohen

Harvard Law School; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Charles C. Y. Wang

Harvard Business School (HBS); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: June 1, 2017

Abstract

Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Staggered Boards, Takeover Defense, Antitakeover Provisions, Firm Value, Delaware, Airgas

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Alma and Wang, Charles C. Y., Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value (June 1, 2017). Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 125, No. 3, September 2017, pp. 637-647, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 908, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985152 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985152

Alma Cohen (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-4099 (Phone)
(617) 812-0554 (Fax)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Charles C. Y. Wang

Harvard Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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