Download This PaperReexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 125, No. 3, September 2017, pp. 637-647
Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 908
32 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2017 Last revised: 12 Dec 2017
Date Written: June 1, 2017
Abstract
Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Staggered Boards, Takeover Defense, Antitakeover Provisions, Firm Value, Delaware, Airgas
JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium
Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium