Job Fairs: Matching Firms and Workers in a Field Experiment in Ethiopia

55 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2017

See all articles by Girum Tefera Abebe

Girum Tefera Abebe

Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI)

Stefano Caria

University of Oxford

Marcel Fafchamps

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Paolo Falco

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Simon Franklin

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Simon Quinn

University of Oxford

Forhad Shilpi

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: June 7, 2017

Abstract

Do matching frictions affect youth employment in developing countries? This paper studies a randomized controlled trial of job fairs in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The job fairs match firms with a representative sample of young, educated job-seekers. The meetings at the fairs create very few jobs: one for approximately 10 firms that attended. The paper explores reasons for this, and finds significant evidence for mismatched expectations: about wages, about firms' requirements, and the average quality of job-seekers. There is evidence of learning and updating of beliefs in the aftermath of the fair. This changes behavior: both workers and firms invest more in formal job search after the fairs.

Keywords: Labor Policies, Rural Labor Markets

Suggested Citation

Abebe, Girum Tefera and Caria, Stefano and Fafchamps, Marcel and Falco, Paolo and Franklin, Simon and Quinn, Simon R. and Shilpi, Forhad, Job Fairs: Matching Firms and Workers in a Field Experiment in Ethiopia (June 7, 2017). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8092. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985518

Girum Tefera Abebe (Contact Author)

Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) ( email )

P.O. Box 2479
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia

Stefano Caria

University of Oxford

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

Marcel Fafchamps

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Paolo Falco

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

Simon Franklin

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Simon R. Quinn

University of Oxford ( email )

Forhad Shilpi

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-7476 (Phone)
202-522-1151 (Fax)

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