Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts

Abstract

Blockchain technology provides decentralized consensus and potentially enlarges the contracting space through smart contracts with tamper-proofness and algorithmic executions. Meanwhile, generating decentralized consensus entails distributing information that necessarily alters the informational environment. We analyze how decentralization affects consensus effectiveness, and how the quintessential features of blockchain reshape industrial organization and the landscape of competition. Smart contracts can mitigate informational asymmetry and improve welfare and consumer surplus through enhanced entry and competition, yet the irreducible distribution of information during consensus generation may encourage greater collusion. In general, blockchains can sustain market equilibria with a wider range of economic outcomes. We further discuss the implications for anti-trust policies targeted at blockchain applications, such as separating consensus record-keepers from users.

Keywords: Anti-trust, Cryptocurrency, Competition, Decentralization, Distributed Ledger, FinTech, Incomplete Contracts, Collusion, Information, Repeated Games.