The Effects of Pension Program Incentives on Retirement Behavior in Denmark

CLS Working Paper No. 01-08

73 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2002

See all articles by Paul Bingley

Paul Bingley

Aarhus University - National Centre for Register-Based Research

Nabanita Datta Gupta

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Peder J. Pedersen

Department of Economics Aarhus University ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: March 2001

Abstract

The effects of pension program incentives on retirement in Denmark are analyzed in an option value framework. Using eligibility criteria and detailed entitlement rules for the five main publicly-funded retirement programs, we calculate social security wealth, one year pension accrual and forward-looking incentive measures. Estimation results from an option value analysis are used to simulate the expected outcome from a set of strategic reforms of retirement policy.

Keywords: retirement, public pension programs, option value analysis, pension reform

JEL Classification: H55, J26

Suggested Citation

Bingley, Paul and Datta Gupta, Nabanita and Pedersen, Peder J., The Effects of Pension Program Incentives on Retirement Behavior in Denmark (March 2001). CLS Working Paper No. 01-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=298583 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.298583

Paul Bingley

Aarhus University - National Centre for Register-Based Research ( email )

8000 Århus C, 8210
Denmark

Nabanita Datta Gupta (Contact Author)

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
8210 Aarhus V
Denmark
+45 87165207 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://pure.au.dk/portal/da/ndg@econ.au.dk

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Peder J. Pedersen

Department of Economics Aarhus University ( email )

DK-8000 Aarhus
Denmark
+45 8942 1581 (Phone)
+45 8613 6334 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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