Audit market concentration, legal regime, and audit fees: An international investigation

International Journal of Auditing 28: 206-225.

Posted: 14 Jun 2017 Last revised: 1 Jun 2024

See all articles by Eugenia Y. Lee

Eugenia Y. Lee

Sejong University

Jong-Hag Choi

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration

Eunhee Kim

CUNY Baruch College

Hee-Yeon Sunwoo

Seoul National University

Date Written: June 18, 2023

Abstract

Despite regulators' on-going concerns on the high concentration of the current audit market, the effects of concentration on auditors' behavior is still debated. We provide an answer to this unresolved issue by considering the role of legal regime in shaping auditors' pricing strategy in a concentrated market. Using data from 33 countries, we find no significant association between audit market concentration and audit fees in the pooled international sample. However, a country's legal regime changes this association dramatically: the association is significantly positive in countries with a weak legal regime but becomes weaker and eventually turns negative as countries' legal regime becomes stronger. Our study highlights the importance of country-level institutions in determining how market structure affects market participants' behavior.

Keywords: audit fees, audit market concentration, audit market structure, competition, international audit, legal regime

JEL Classification: K42; L11; M42

Suggested Citation

Lee, Eugenia and Choi, Jong and Kim, Eunhee and Sunwoo, Hee-Yeon, Audit market concentration, legal regime, and audit fees: An international investigation (June 18, 2023). International Journal of Auditing 28: 206-225., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985877 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985877

Eugenia Lee

Sejong University ( email )

Seoul

Jong Choi

Seoul National University - College of Business Administration ( email )

Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Eunhee Kim

CUNY Baruch College ( email )

17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10021
United States

Hee-Yeon Sunwoo (Contact Author)

Seoul National University ( email )

Kwanak-gu
Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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