Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision

CER-ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich Working Paper No. 17/272

29 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2017

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Oriol Tejada

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich

Date Written: June 15, 2017

Abstract

We introduce a two-stage, multiple-round voting procedure where the thresholds needed for approval require a qualified majority and vary with the proposal on the table. We apply such a procedure to instances of public-good provision where the citizens’ valuations can take two values and are private. We show that the procedure elicits and aggregates the information about the valuations and implements the utilitarian optimal public good level. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered. We also develop a compound procedure to ensure utilitarian optimality when there are arbitrarily finitely many types of citizen.

Keywords: Voting; Utilitarianism; Implementation

JEL Classification: C72; D70

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans and Tejada, Oriol, Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision (June 15, 2017). CER-ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich Working Paper No. 17/272 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986980 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2986980

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Oriol Tejada (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
41446329693 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/mip/people/toriol

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