Guanxi-Networks, Lawyers and Marketization of Parochial Corruption in China's Courts
16 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2017
Date Written: May 16, 2017
Abstract
In this article, I examine how privileged exchange opportunities in parochial corruption in China’s courts become marketized and made accessible to those who do not enjoy a relational-tie. To that end, I first analyze the conceptual features of guanxi, a particularistic relationship between two (or more) individuals who share a dyadic non-transferable relational-tie, as well as the operational rationale of guanxi-based exchange. Then I proceed to investigate what has led to the marketization of guanxi-based parochial corruption. The answer lies in the emergence of professional “judicial brokers”, particularly lawyers, who are best positioned to broker corrupt deals between judges and litigants. I also explain how a self-executable payment scheme, thanks to the asymmetry of anti-corruption measures, is developed to help solve the enforcement problem of illegal corrupt transactions. Finally, I provide some preliminary comparative reflections on guanxi and informal networks in other legal systems.
Keywords: guanxi, judicial corruption, China, corruption brokers, clientelism, transaction costs, parochial corruption, market corruption
JEL Classification: K00, K41, K42, K14
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