Guanxi-Networks, Lawyers and Marketization of Parochial Corruption in China's Courts

16 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2017

See all articles by Ling Li

Ling Li

University of Vienna - Department of East Asian Studies

Date Written: May 16, 2017

Abstract

In this article, I examine how privileged exchange opportunities in parochial corruption in China’s courts become marketized and made accessible to those who do not enjoy a relational-tie. To that end, I first analyze the conceptual features of guanxi, a particularistic relationship between two (or more) individuals who share a dyadic non-transferable relational-tie, as well as the operational rationale of guanxi-based exchange. Then I proceed to investigate what has led to the marketization of guanxi-based parochial corruption. The answer lies in the emergence of professional “judicial brokers”, particularly lawyers, who are best positioned to broker corrupt deals between judges and litigants. I also explain how a self-executable payment scheme, thanks to the asymmetry of anti-corruption measures, is developed to help solve the enforcement problem of illegal corrupt transactions. Finally, I provide some preliminary comparative reflections on guanxi and informal networks in other legal systems.

Keywords: guanxi, judicial corruption, China, corruption brokers, clientelism, transaction costs, parochial corruption, market corruption

JEL Classification: K00, K41, K42, K14

Suggested Citation

Li, Ling, Guanxi-Networks, Lawyers and Marketization of Parochial Corruption in China's Courts (May 16, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2987809

Ling Li (Contact Author)

University of Vienna - Department of East Asian Studies ( email )

Campus-Altes AKH
Spitalgasse 2, Hof 2, Eingang 2.3
Wien, 1090
Austria

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