Deciding on what to Decide
56 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2017 Last revised: 13 Jun 2019
Date Written: June 11, 2019
We study collective decision-making procedures involving the formation of an agenda of issues and the subsequent vote on the position for each issue on the agenda. Issues that are not on the agenda remain unsettled. We use a protocol-free equilibrium concept introduced by Dutta et al. (2004) and show for two prominent voting procedures that essentially any subset of issues may be excluded from the agenda in equilibrium. What is voted upon and what is not depends on the voters' preferences in a subtle manner, suggesting a high degree of instability. We also discuss further conditions under which our results about the variability of agendas result may be qualified. In particular, we study those cases where all issues will be put in the agenda.
Keywords: Issues, agendas, voting rules, equilibrium collections of continuation agendas
JEL Classification: D71, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation