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The New Mandate Owners: Passive Asset Managers and the Decoupling of Corporate Ownership

Antitrust Chronicle, June, pp 51-57

7 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2017  

Carmel Shenkar

University of Amsterdam / CORPNET

Eelke M. Heemskerk

University of Amsterdam / CORPNET

Jan Fichtner

University of Amsterdam / CORPNET

Date Written: June 19, 2017

Abstract

A major shift toward passively managed index funds in recent years has led to the re-concentration of corporate ownership in the hands of just three large asset management firms, the Big Three: BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street. We propose that this trend has re-structured ownership in capital markets. Adopting a contractual view to the corporate share, we re-define share holding and suggest that the New Mandate Owners in fact hold the essence of corporate power, as their aggregated positions capture the core element of the franchise of corporate voting.

Keywords: Passive Asset Managers; Shareholder Power; Mandate Owners; corporate ownership

Suggested Citation

Shenkar, Carmel and Heemskerk, Eelke M. and Fichtner, Jan, The New Mandate Owners: Passive Asset Managers and the Decoupling of Corporate Ownership (June 19, 2017). Antitrust Chronicle, June, pp 51-57. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2988937

Carmel Shenkar

University of Amsterdam / CORPNET ( email )

Nieuwe Achtergracht 166
Amsterdam, 1018 WV
Netherlands

Eelke Heemskerk (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam / CORPNET ( email )

PO BOX 15578
Amsterdam, 1001NB
Netherlands
+31 (0)20 525 2628 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.eelkeheemskerk.nl

Jan Fichtner

University of Amsterdam / CORPNET ( email )

Nieuwe Achtergracht 166
Amsterdam, 1018 WV
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.jfichtner.net

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