Against Judicial Accountability: Evidence from the Six Month List

83 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2017 Last revised: 9 Mar 2018

Miguel de Figueiredo

University of Connecticut - School of Law

Alexandra D. Lahav

University of Connecticut - School of Law

Peter Siegelman

University of Connecticut - School of Law

Date Written: February 20, 2018

Abstract

A little known mechanism instituted to improve judicial accountability and speed up the work of the federal judiciary has led to unintended consequences, many of them unfortunate. Federal district court judges are subject to a requirement known as the Six Month List. By law, every judge’s backlog (cases older than three years and motions pending more than six months) is made public twice a year. Since judges have life tenure and fixed salaries, a mere reporting requirement might not influence their behavior. But it does. Using the complete record of all federal civil cases between 1980 and 2017 and a hand-coded sample of summary judgment resolutions, we demonstrate that the List leads judges to close substantially more cases and decide more motions in the week immediately before it is compiled. While average motion processing time is shortened by 10 to 40 days, duration is actually lengthened for some motions (those for which the deadline is least pressing). Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that the List has substantive consequences: in an effort to comply with the List, judges may be making more errors. Theory suggests that giving judges an incentive for faster case processing is probably a mistake. But since this incentive is Congressionally mandated, we offer an alternative mechanism that will limit distortions until Congress acts to relieve the federal courts of this unnecessary burden.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Judging

JEL Classification: K41

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, Miguel and Lahav, Alexandra D. and Siegelman, Peter, Against Judicial Accountability: Evidence from the Six Month List (February 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989777 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2989777

Miguel De Figueiredo

University of Connecticut - School of Law ( email )

65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States

Alexandra D. Lahav

University of Connecticut - School of Law ( email )

65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States

Peter Siegelman (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut - School of Law ( email )

65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States
860-570-5238 (Phone)
860-570-5242 (Fax)

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