Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Digital Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy

European Law Review (2018 Forthcoming)

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15/2017

30 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2017 Last revised: 6 Dec 2017

Michèle Finck

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; University of Oxford

Date Written: June 20, 2017

Abstract

This paper examines digital data-driven platforms and their impact on contemporary regulatory paradigms. While these phenomena are increasingly proclaimed as paradigm altering in many respects, they remain relatively little understood, including in their regulatory dimension. Lawmakers around the globe including the European Commission are currently trying to make sense of these evolutions and determine how to regulate digital platforms. In its 2016 Communication on Online Platforms, the European Commission proposed various options for regulating the platform economy, including self-regulatory and co-regulatory models. The Commission’s assumption that self-regulation or co-regulation can replace top-down legislative intervention in the platform economy forms the background of this paper, which examines these three options to determine their respective suitability. We shall conclude that as command-and-control regulation as well as self-regulation raise significant problems in their application to the platform economy, co-regulation emerges as the most adequate option if certain conditions are complied with.

Keywords: platforms, sharing economy, EU Law, regulation, co-regulation, self-regulation, big data, platform economy

Suggested Citation

Finck, Michèle, Digital Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy (June 20, 2017). European Law Review (2018 Forthcoming); LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990043

Michèle Finck (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

Paper statistics

Downloads
362
Rank
69,455
Abstract Views
1,269