Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment

29 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2017

See all articles by Robert Dur

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Ben Vollaard

CentER, Tilburg University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 06, 2017

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement can be strengthened by making law enforcement activities more salient. Our focus is on illegal disposal of household garbage in residential areas. At a random subset of 56 locations in a city in the Netherlands, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting bright warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags saying that the item was “Found by law enforcement; fine minimally 90 euros”. We find evidence for a substantial reduction in illegal disposal of garbage as a result of the treatment at locations with garbage disposal containers, but not at locations with glass/paper disposal containers. Overall, the estimated treatment effect is negative, but imprecisely estimated.

Keywords: Law Enforcement, Deterrence, Perception, Salience, Disorder

JEL Classification: C930, K420

Suggested Citation

Dur, Robert and Vollaard, Ben, Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment (June 06, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6499, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990883 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2990883

Robert Dur (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Tinbergen Institute

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Ben Vollaard

CentER, Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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