A Theory of Entrepreneurship and Institutional Uncertainty

46 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2017

See all articles by Per L. Bylund

Per L. Bylund

School of Entrepreneurship; Ratio Institute; Ludwig von Mises Institute

Matthew McCaffrey

University of Manchester - Manchester Business School

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

Uncertainty and institutions are each vital concepts in entrepreneurship research. However, little work has been done to combine them into a consistent conceptual framework for analyzing the dynamic aspects of entrepreneurial action, uncertainty, and institutional change. Using insights from new institutional economics, we develop a model that explains the institutional uncertainty resulting from conflicts between institutions on different “levels” of social activity. We further explain how entrepreneurs can both cause and mitigate this uncertainty through market and institutional action. Finally, we focus on a special case of institutional uncertainty, “regime uncertainty”, wherein entrepreneurs are left without reliable means to overcome uncertainty in political institutions.

Keywords: entrepreneurship, uncertainty, institutions, judgment, regime uncertainty

JEL Classification: D81, L26

Suggested Citation

Bylund, Per L. and McCaffrey, Matthew, A Theory of Entrepreneurship and Institutional Uncertainty (2017). Journal of Business Venturing, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990928

Per L. Bylund

School of Entrepreneurship ( email )

Oklahoma State University
424 Business building
Stillwater, OK 74078
United States
4057444301 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://business.okstate.edu/directory/bylund-per-694946.html

Ratio Institute ( email )

P.O. Box 3203
SE-103 64 Stockholm
Sweden

Ludwig von Mises Institute ( email )

Auburn, AL
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mises.org/bylund

Matthew McCaffrey (Contact Author)

University of Manchester - Manchester Business School ( email )

United Kingdom

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