Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists

IEER Working Paper No. 97

41 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2002

See all articles by Colin Camerer

Colin Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

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Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental game theory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of evolutionary explanations and of social preference theory in organizing the data in a coherent way.

JEL Classification: C91, M40, M46

Suggested Citation

Camerer, Colin F. and Fehr, Ernst, Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists (January 2002). IEER Working Paper No. 97, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=299143 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.299143

Colin F. Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

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Ernst Fehr (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

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Switzerland
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