Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks

51 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2002 Last revised: 15 Apr 2024

See all articles by Allen N. Berger

Allen N. Berger

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business

Nathan Miller

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Mitchell A. Petersen

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Raghuram G. Rajan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeremy C. Stein

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally 'difficult' credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively. All of this is consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks.

Suggested Citation

Berger, Allen N. and Miller, Nathan and Petersen, Mitchell A. and Rajan, Raghuram G. and Stein, Jeremy C., Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks (January 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w8752, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=299164

Allen N. Berger

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business ( email )

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Nathan Miller

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

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Mitchell A. Petersen

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

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Raghuram G. Rajan

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Jeremy C. Stein (Contact Author)

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HOME PAGE: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/stein/stein.html

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