Closing the Gap: Board Gender Quotas and Hiring Practices

55 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2017 Last revised: 23 Oct 2020

See all articles by Daniel Ferreira

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Edith Ginglinger

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Marie-Aude Laguna

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG

Yasmine Skalli

Université Paris Dauphine

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 5, 2020

Abstract

We study the impact of board gender quotas on firms’ hiring and retention practices. We find that female director tenure significantly increases following the introduction of a quota in France in 2011, with stronger effects among less gender-diverse firms and firms that use networks for hiring. These findings suggest that (some) firms find it costly to comply with the quota law. We also find that female directors hired after the quo-ta are more independent, more experienced, more internationally diverse, and no less academically qualified than those hired before the quota. The gender gaps in most director characteristics also narrow. The evidence suggests that, despite their perceived costs, board gender quotas force firms to change their hiring practices, which allow firms to tap into a deeper talent pool.

Keywords: Corporate Boards, Gender Quotas, Corporate Governance, Labor Markets, Matching, Turnover

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J70, J63

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Daniel and Ginglinger, Edith and Laguna, Marie-Aude and Skalli, Yasmine, Closing the Gap: Board Gender Quotas and Hiring Practices (October 5, 2020). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 520/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992213 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2992213

Daniel Ferreira (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Edith Ginglinger

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Marie-Aude Laguna

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG ( email )

place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
cedex 16
Paris, 75775
France

Yasmine Skalli

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

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