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Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching

63 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2017 Last revised: 4 Aug 2017

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Edith Ginglinger

Université Paris Dauphine

Marie-Aude Laguna

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG

Yasmine Skalli

Université Paris Dauphine

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2017

Abstract

We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third following the introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.

Keywords: Corporate Boards, Gender Quotas, Corporate Governance, Labor Markets, Matching, Turnover

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J70, J63

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Daniel and Ginglinger, Edith and Laguna, Marie-Aude and Skalli, Yasmine, Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching (August 1, 2017). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 520/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992213

Daniel Ferreira (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Edith Ginglinger

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/edithginglinger/home

Marie-Aude Laguna

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG ( email )

place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
cedex 16
Paris, 75775
France

Yasmine Skalli

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

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