Local Government Efficiency and Anti-Immigrant Violence

39 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2017 Last revised: 6 May 2018

See all articles by Conrad Ziller

Conrad Ziller

University of Cologne

Sara Wallace Goodman

University of California, Irvine - Department of Political Science

Date Written: June 26, 2017

Abstract

Communities provide a crucial experiential context for native-immigrant interactions, yet we know little about the impact of local government performance on shaping public responses to immigrants. Building on arguments considering efficient governments as critical factors in mitigating denizens’ political deprivation and social cohesion, we argue that efficient local governments were able to prevent anti-immigrant behavior in Germany during the large refugee intake in 2015. Using cost efficiency modeling to generate a measure of local government efficiency (LGE), we show that high LGE is associated with fewer incidents of anti-immigrant violence in Germany in 2015. Testing the broader implications of our theory, we employ longitudinal data on LGE of Dutch municipalities merged with police records of criminal offenses against immigrants (2012-2015). Results from wo-way fixed effects models show a systematic but modest, negative link between efficiency and violence. Our results suggest that improving local governance can have salutary benefits on inter-group relations.

Keywords: local government, efficiency, immigrant integration, Western Europe, refugee, violence, anti-immigrant attitudes

Suggested Citation

Ziller, Conrad and Goodman, Sara Wallace, Local Government Efficiency and Anti-Immigrant Violence (June 26, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2992545

Conrad Ziller (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus Magnus Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Sara Wallace Goodman

University of California, Irvine - Department of Political Science ( email )

Irvine, CA 92697
United States

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