The Effect of State Wiretapping Legislation on Law Enforcement Productivity

30 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2017 Last revised: 15 Aug 2019

See all articles by Jason Chan

Jason Chan

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Jin-Hyuk Kim

University of Colorado at Boulder

Liad Wagman

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT

Date Written: August 15, 2019

Abstract

Nineteen states relaxed their state wiretapping statutes following the 9/11 terror attacks. It later turned out that law-enforcement agencies took advantage of the relaxed wiretap provisions to primarily investigate drug crimes. We show that such law changes can theoretically decrease or increase crime detection as well as underlying crime counts. Using data from the U.S. Courts' Wiretap Reports, we find that the state law changes increased prosecutorial productivity in terms of producing arrests and convictions from state wiretap operations, in support of the law change increasing crime detection and decreasing crime counts.

Keywords: Wiretap surveillance; criminal justice; drug crime

JEL Classification: K14, K42, L96

Suggested Citation

Chan, Jason and Kim, Jin-Hyuk and Wagman, Liad, The Effect of State Wiretapping Legislation on Law Enforcement Productivity (August 15, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2994407

Jason Chan

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty/jason-chan

Jin-Hyuk Kim (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

Liad Wagman

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT ( email )

565 W Adams St Suite 412
Chicago, IL 60661
United States
7739809883 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://lwagman.org

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
69
Abstract Views
629
rank
343,798
PlumX Metrics