Did Post-9/11 Wiretap Legislation Increase Law Enforcement Productivity?

22 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2017 Last revised: 5 Nov 2020

See all articles by Jason Chan

Jason Chan

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Jin-Hyuk Kim

University of Colorado at Boulder

Liad Wagman

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT

Date Written: August 15, 2019

Abstract

The effect of law changes on public sector productivity is a growing, yet underresearched, area in economics. Nineteen states enacted state wiretapping legislation following the 9/11 terror attacks, the provisions of which mirror the provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act that relaxed the use of wiretap surveillance. Using a proxy variable approach, we estimate wiretap productivity in terms of producing arrests and convictions originating from wiretap orders issued on narcotics offenses from 1998 to 2005. We find that the post-9/11 state wiretap law changes increased the unobserved total factor productivity, a measure of productive efficiency.

Keywords: Wiretap, surveillance, law enforcement

JEL Classification: D24, K42

Suggested Citation

Chan, Jason and Kim, Jin-Hyuk and Wagman, Liad, Did Post-9/11 Wiretap Legislation Increase Law Enforcement Productivity? (August 15, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2994407

Jason Chan

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty/jason-chan

Jin-Hyuk Kim (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

Liad Wagman

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT ( email )

565 W Adams St Suite 412
Chicago, IL 60661
United States
7739809883 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://lwagman.org

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