Unlocking the Housing-Related Benefits of Telework: A Case for Government Intervention

Real Estate Law Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, Winter 2017

71 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2017 Last revised: 17 Aug 2018

W.C. Bunting

Fox School of Business and Management

Date Written: August 2, 2017

Abstract

The central claim of the present article is that some form of government intervention is necessary to make telework arrangements sufficiently binding in the long-run for employees living in, or near, city centers to feel comfortable incurring the costs of relocating to more remote, lower-priced areas, and to ensure the long-run financial self-sufficiency of private telework centers, which provide important benefits, not just to employers and employees, but to society generally. The public benefit considered here is the capacity for telework, and telework centers specifically, to provide lower-priced housing alternatives for middle- and high-income earners who choose to live in, or near, the city center to reduce the time spent commuting, but who would otherwise choose to live in more remote, lower-priced areas if commuting costs were lower. As explained, a minimal amount of government intervention is necessary, however, to overcome several key economic challenges that preclude employees from relocating to remote, lower-priced exurban or rural communities, as well as the formation of a new and exciting private-sector enterprise: the privately-operated telework center.

Keywords: Housing, Telework, Incentives, Government Intervention

JEL Classification: K11, H30, R12, R41

Suggested Citation

Bunting, W.C., Unlocking the Housing-Related Benefits of Telework: A Case for Government Intervention (August 2, 2017). Real Estate Law Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, Winter 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994779 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2994779

William Bunting (Contact Author)

Fox School of Business and Management ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States

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