National or Sub-National Parties: Does Party Geographic Scope Matter?

57 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2017 Last revised: 13 Jul 2020

See all articles by Alexey Makarin

Alexey Makarin

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ricardo Pique

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Fernando M. Aragon

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 12, 2020

Abstract

In many developing countries, local elections are increasingly dominated by political parties with a local or regional scope. This paper examines whether the geographic scope of a ruling party (national vs. sub-national) affects local policy outcomes. This party dimension can be important due to differences in parties' ability to select and discipline politicians, coordinate with other government institutions, or internalize geographical spillovers. Using a regression discontinuity design and data from Peruvian municipalities, we find that a party's geographic scope has negligible effects on most observable policy outcomes. We also document a small impact on the mayor's education and municipal accountability. The lack of stronger effects appears to reflect policy convergence driven by political competition. Overall, our results challenge the view that sub-national-party rule is detrimental to local governance.

Keywords: National parties, local governance, party system, Peru, regression discontinuity

JEL Classification: O12, D72, H7

Suggested Citation

Makarin, Alexey and Pique, Ricardo and Aragon, Fernando M., National or Sub-National Parties: Does Party Geographic Scope Matter? (May 12, 2020). Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 146, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2996172

Alexey Makarin (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://alexeymakarin.github.io/

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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Ricardo Pique

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )

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Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

Fernando M. Aragon

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada

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