National or Sub-National Parties: Does Party Geographic Scope Matter?

53 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2017 Last revised: 9 Jul 2019

See all articles by Alexey Makarin

Alexey Makarin

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Ricardo Pique

Ryerson University, Faculty of Arts - Department of Economics

Fernando M. Aragon

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 4, 2019

Abstract

In many developing countries, sub-national parties have emerged as dominant forces in local elections. This denationalization of local politics has raised concerns of increasing regional populism, weaker accountability, and worsening political selection. This paper examines whether the geographic scope of a ruling party (national vs. sub-national) affects policy outcomes, such as budget size and expenditure allocation. Using a regression discontinuity design and rich data from Peruvian municipalities, we find negligible differences in policy outcomes between national and sub-national parties. We also document a small impact on the mayor's education and municipal accountability. The lack of stronger effects appears to reflect policy convergence driven by political competition. Overall, our results challenge the view that sub-national parties are detrimental to local governance.

Keywords: National parties, local governance, party system, Peru, regression discontinuity

JEL Classification: O12, D72, H7

Suggested Citation

Makarin, Alexey and Pique Cebrecos, Ricardo Santiago and Aragon, Fernando M., National or Sub-National Parties: Does Party Geographic Scope Matter? (July 4, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2996172

Alexey Makarin (Contact Author)

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, Lazio 00187
Italy

Ricardo Santiago Pique Cebrecos

Ryerson University, Faculty of Arts - Department of Economics ( email )

Canada

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/piquericardo/

Fernando M. Aragon

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada

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