Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers
57 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2017
Date Written: June 27, 2017
We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited information. A simple cheap talk strategy of the expert can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their opinions. When there is a significant informational gap, decision makers vote in the expert’s interest by focusing only on the expert’s message, even though they know she has her own bias.
Keywords: Cheap Talk, Voting, Polarization
JEL Classification: D71, D72, D78, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation