Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers

57 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2017

See all articles by Daeyoung Jeong

Daeyoung Jeong

Pohang University of Science and Technology

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 27, 2017

Abstract

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited information. A simple cheap talk strategy of the expert can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their opinions. When there is a significant informational gap, decision makers vote in the expert’s interest by focusing only on the expert’s message, even though they know she has her own bias.

Keywords: Cheap Talk, Voting, Polarization

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D78, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Jeong, Daeyoung, Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers (June 27, 2017). Bank of Korea WP 2017-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2996292

Daeyoung Jeong (Contact Author)

Pohang University of Science and Technology ( email )

77 Cheongam-ro
Pohang
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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