Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching

60 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2017

See all articles by Daniel Ferreira

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Edith Ginglinger

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University

Marie-Aude Laguna

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG

Yasmine Skalli

Université Paris Dauphine

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2017

Abstract

We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third following the introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.

Keywords: Corporate Boards, corporate governance, Gender Quotas, labor markets, Matching, Turnover

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J63, J70

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Daniel and Ginglinger, Edith and Laguna, Marie-Aude and Skalli, Yasmine, Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching (June 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12117. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996662

Daniel Ferreira (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Edith Ginglinger

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Marie-Aude Laguna

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG ( email )

place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
cedex 16
Paris, 75775
France

Yasmine Skalli

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

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