Matching with Multilateral Contracts

31 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2017 Last revised: 8 Dec 2018

See all articles by Marzena J. Rostek

Marzena J. Rostek

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Nathan Yoder

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 7, 2018

Abstract

We examine stability in matching environments where agreements may be multilateral or have externalities. We offer a general characterization of stability in terms of aggregate (rather than individual) choice and give two existence results. The first is for environments where agreements are substitutes and the market behaves as if it has two implicit “sides”. The other shows that a unique stable outcome exists when agents' choices from the set of all contracts are sufficiently aligned, even without substitutability. Both results show that stable outcomes do not require two sides of the market within which no contracting occurs.

Keywords: Multilateral Matching, Externalities, Matching with Contracts, Stability

JEL Classification: C78, C62, D47, D85, L14, F51, F55

Suggested Citation

Rostek, Marzena J. and Yoder, Nathan, Matching with Multilateral Contracts (December 7, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997223 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997223

Marzena J. Rostek

University of Wisconsin - Madison ( email )

1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53703
United States
(608) 262-6723 (Phone)
(608) 262-2033 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mrostek

Nathan Yoder (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/nathanyoderecon/

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